神马作文网求一篇阅读理解的全文翻译
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求一篇阅读理解的全文翻译
Many critics of the current welfare system argue that existing welfare regulations lead to family instability. They believe that those regulations, which exclude most poor husband-and-wife families from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) assistance grants, contribute to the problem of family dissolution. Thus, they conclude that expanding the set of families that can eligibly get such grants would result in a marked strengthening of the low-income family structure.
If all poor families could receive welfare, would the incidence of instability change markedly? The answer to this question depends on the relative importance of three types of potential welfare recipients. The first is the “cheater”-the husband who is reported to have abandoned his family, but in fact disappears only when the social worker is in the neighborhood. The second consists of a loving husband and devoted father who, sensing his own inadequacy as a family supporter, leaves so that his wife and children may enjoy the relative benefit provided by public assistance. There is very little evidence that these two types are significant.
The third type is the unhappily married couple, who remain together out of a sense of economic responsibility or their children, because of the high costs of separation, or because of the consumption benefits of marriage. This group is large. The formation, maintenance, and dissolution of the family is in large part a function of the relative balance between the benefits and costs of marriage as seen by the individual members of the marriage. Since the family performs certain functions society regards as vital, a complex network of social and legal process has evolved to reinforce marriage. Much of the variation in martial stability across income classes can be explained by the variation in costs of dissolution imposed by society, such as division of poverty, and child support.
Marital stability is related to the costs of achieving an acceptable agreement on family consumption and production and to the prevailing social price of instability in the marriage partners' social-economic group. Expected income exerts pressures on family instability by reducing the cost of dissolution. To the extent that welfare is a form of government-subsidized AFDC payments, it reduces the costs of separation and guarantees a minimal standard of living for wife and children. So welfare opportunities are a significant determinant of family instability in poor neighborhoods, but this is not the result to AFDC regulations that exclude most intact families from coverage. Rather, welfare-related instability occurs because public assistance lowers both the benefits of marriage and the costs of its breach by providing a system of government-subsidized payments.
Many critics of the current welfare system argue that existing welfare regulations lead to family instability. They believe that those regulations, which exclude most poor husband-and-wife families from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) assistance grants, contribute to the problem of family dissolution. Thus, they conclude that expanding the set of families that can eligibly get such grants would result in a marked strengthening of the low-income family structure.
If all poor families could receive welfare, would the incidence of instability change markedly? The answer to this question depends on the relative importance of three types of potential welfare recipients. The first is the “cheater”-the husband who is reported to have abandoned his family, but in fact disappears only when the social worker is in the neighborhood. The second consists of a loving husband and devoted father who, sensing his own inadequacy as a family supporter, leaves so that his wife and children may enjoy the relative benefit provided by public assistance. There is very little evidence that these two types are significant.
The third type is the unhappily married couple, who remain together out of a sense of economic responsibility or their children, because of the high costs of separation, or because of the consumption benefits of marriage. This group is large. The formation, maintenance, and dissolution of the family is in large part a function of the relative balance between the benefits and costs of marriage as seen by the individual members of the marriage. Since the family performs certain functions society regards as vital, a complex network of social and legal process has evolved to reinforce marriage. Much of the variation in martial stability across income classes can be explained by the variation in costs of dissolution imposed by society, such as division of poverty, and child support.
Marital stability is related to the costs of achieving an acceptable agreement on family consumption and production and to the prevailing social price of instability in the marriage partners' social-economic group. Expected income exerts pressures on family instability by reducing the cost of dissolution. To the extent that welfare is a form of government-subsidized AFDC payments, it reduces the costs of separation and guarantees a minimal standard of living for wife and children. So welfare opportunities are a significant determinant of family instability in poor neighborhoods, but this is not the result to AFDC regulations that exclude most intact families from coverage. Rather, welfare-related instability occurs because public assistance lowers both the benefits of marriage and the costs of its breach by providing a system of government-subsidized payments.
许多当前福利制度的批评家认为家庭的不稳定是现行的福利规则造成的.他们认为那些把贫困夫妇家庭从补助计划补助金中排除的规则是造成家庭分解的原因.因此,他们总结,扩大适当取得补助金的家庭范围,将会明显地加固低收入家庭结构.
如果所有贫困家庭都能得到福利救济,家庭不稳定性几率会有大的变化吗?答案取决于三种潜在福利收件人的相对重要性.第一种即“骗子”型—报告称已抛弃家庭的丈夫,事实上,当社会工作者来到其生活的街道时该说法就不成立了；第二种由一个慈爱的丈夫和忠实的父亲组成,该父亲,认为自己无法供应一个家庭而离开,这样其妻子和孩子就可以享受到社会授助提供的相对利益.认为这两种类型重要的证据很少.
第三种是不幸结合的夫妇,出于经济责任或其子女、分开的高代价或婚姻的利益等原因而继续呆在一起.这是一个大的群体.一个家庭的组成、维持和解散是婚姻各成员见证的利益和婚姻代价相对平衡的一个功能.既然家庭在社会中起着一定重要作用,一套复杂的社会和法律手续将会用来加强婚姻.收入阶层的婚姻稳定性的许多变化可以用社会强加的离婚费用的变化来解释,如,贫困的划分和儿童抚养等.
婚姻的稳定性与就达成家庭消费和生产可接受共识所付出的代价有关,也与婚姻伴侣社会-经济团体中不稳定的社会盛行价格有关.预期收入通过减少离婚费用给家庭不稳定性施加压力.在这个意义上,福利是政府-补贴补助计划的款项,通过减少离婚费用并保证妻子和儿女的最低生活标准.因此,在贫困胡同里,获得福利的机会是家庭不稳定性的决定性因素,但是这并不是补助计划规则排除许多完整家庭范围所造成的.或者可以这样说,相关福利的不稳定性的产生是因为政府-补助款款项的提供使社会补助中婚姻利益和违背婚姻的费用减低了.
如果所有贫困家庭都能得到福利救济,家庭不稳定性几率会有大的变化吗?答案取决于三种潜在福利收件人的相对重要性.第一种即“骗子”型—报告称已抛弃家庭的丈夫,事实上,当社会工作者来到其生活的街道时该说法就不成立了；第二种由一个慈爱的丈夫和忠实的父亲组成,该父亲,认为自己无法供应一个家庭而离开,这样其妻子和孩子就可以享受到社会授助提供的相对利益.认为这两种类型重要的证据很少.
第三种是不幸结合的夫妇,出于经济责任或其子女、分开的高代价或婚姻的利益等原因而继续呆在一起.这是一个大的群体.一个家庭的组成、维持和解散是婚姻各成员见证的利益和婚姻代价相对平衡的一个功能.既然家庭在社会中起着一定重要作用,一套复杂的社会和法律手续将会用来加强婚姻.收入阶层的婚姻稳定性的许多变化可以用社会强加的离婚费用的变化来解释,如,贫困的划分和儿童抚养等.
婚姻的稳定性与就达成家庭消费和生产可接受共识所付出的代价有关,也与婚姻伴侣社会-经济团体中不稳定的社会盛行价格有关.预期收入通过减少离婚费用给家庭不稳定性施加压力.在这个意义上,福利是政府-补贴补助计划的款项,通过减少离婚费用并保证妻子和儿女的最低生活标准.因此,在贫困胡同里,获得福利的机会是家庭不稳定性的决定性因素,但是这并不是补助计划规则排除许多完整家庭范围所造成的.或者可以这样说,相关福利的不稳定性的产生是因为政府-补助款款项的提供使社会补助中婚姻利益和违背婚姻的费用减低了.