英语翻译2.Incentive contracts in the Chinese banking industryTo

英语翻译
2.Incentive contracts in the Chinese banking industry
To comprehend the impact of incentive contracts it is important to be familiar with the institutional background of China’s banking industry,the place in which the incentive contracts that we are studying were designed and executed.To this end we begin by focusing on two financial institutions in rural China,the Agricultural Bank of China(ABC)and the Rural Credit Cooperatives(RCC),covered by the survey data.
The ABC is one of the four specialized state-owned banks in China.5 It serves the financial needs of both urban and rural areas.In contrast,RCCs exclusively target rural clients.The main difference between the ABC and RCCs lies in the nature of ownership:the RCCs have a collective ownership status allowing them more flexibility in complying with central financial policies.The RCCs were formerly under the supervision of the ABC,but attained the status of an independent financial institution in 1994.These two financial institutions currently dominate the formal financial system in rural China.As of the late 1990s,they accounted for nearly 80 percent of total rural deposits and loans(Brandt and Li,2003;Brandt et al.,2005).
The ABC has its headquarters in Beijing and has branch offices at locations corresponding to every administrative level.6 In contrast,RCCs are local financial institutions with their headquarters–called the Federation of RCCs (xin yong lian she) –at the county level.In general,both the ABC and RCCs have established branches(henceforth referred to as bank branches)in each township.The locations of bank branches reflect the territorial structure of the governmental system,and the scope of business is designed to minimize overlapping and competition within the same institution.
Before the economic reforms started,China’s state-owned banks,just like other SOEs,were primarily subject to centralized management and economic planning.The government provided no incentives to motivate bank managers or workers to exert effort; their pay was predetermined and thus independent of performance.Since the early 1980s,however,China has sought to reform its banking sector.So far,the government’s major reform involves the introduction of performance-based incentives for bank managers and workers; the managers are provided incentives,but the state has not relinquished ownership of the banks(Groves et al.,1994).As a major reform initiative to improve the performance of state-owned banks,especially targeted at increasing deposits and reducing non-performing loans,the government initiated a bonus system for state-owned banks in the mid-1980s.Usually,the higher-level bank,a county bank in our case,signs a so-called responsibility contract individually with each township branch manager.The contracts,normally signed on an annual basis,specify a formula tying the bank manager’s monetary rewards to performance.

2.奖励的合同,在中国银行界
理解的影响,激励合同,这是重要的是要熟悉的体制背景下中国的银行界,发生在其中的激励合同,我们正在研究,设计并执行枪决.为此,我们首先着眼于两个金融机构在中国农村,中国农业银行（ ABC法）和农村信用社（碾压混凝土） ,统计调查所涵盖的数据.
美国广播公司就是其中的四个专门国有独资商业银行在中国.5它的经济需要,城市和农村地区.在此相反,农村信用社专门的目标,农村的客户.之间的主要差别ABC和农村信用社,关键在性质所有权：农村信用社有一个集体所有权的地位,让他们更灵活地遵守中央的金融政策.该以前农村信用社的监督下的ABC ,但达到的地位,一个独立的金融机构在1994.these两个金融机构目前主宰正规金融体系在中国农村.例如20世纪90年代末,他们占近80 ％的占农村总存款及贷款（勃兰特和李,2003年;勃兰特等人,2005年） .
美国广播公司其总部设在北京,并已分支办事处的地点,相应的每个行政级别.6此相反,农村信用社是地方金融机构与他们的总部所谓的联邦农村信用社（辛勇佘廉）在县一级.在一般,无论是ABC和农村信用社建立了党支部（此后被称为银行分行）在每一个乡镇.地点银行分行反映领土结构的政府系统,以及业务范围是设计,以尽量减少重叠和竞争,在同一机构.
前经济改革开始,中国的国有独资商业银行,就像其他国有企业,主要是受到集中管理和经济规划.政府没有提供诱因,激励银行经理或工人着力;他们的薪酬是既定的,因此独立的表现.自八十年代初期,但是,中国已要求改革其银行界.直至目前为止,政府的重大改革,涉及引入基于业绩的奖励措施,为银行管理人员和工人;基金经理所提供的诱因,但国家并没有放弃所有权的银行（林等人,1994年） .作为一个重大改革,主动改善的表现,国有独资商业银行,特别是有针对性的增加存款,减少不履约贷款,政府发起了花红制度,为国有独资商业银行在八十年代中期.通常情况下,更高水平的银行,一个县的银行在我们的情况下,标志一个所谓的责任,合同单独与每个乡镇分行经理.合同,通常签署了关于一年度的基础上,指定一个公式绑银行经理的货币奖励表现.